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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONETARY SOLIDARITY: REVISITING THE EURO 
EXPERIMENT 
WALTRAUD SCHELKLE (LSE) 
Abstract: The euro is a unique experiment in monetary history: a group of rather 
different countries adopted voluntarily a common currency, and the supranational 
central bank is deliberately separated from national fiscal institutions. Every member 
state had good reasons to take the risk of joining this experiment of a monetary pool 
of diverse countries. However, the experiment has so far been rather disappointing. 
A political-economic paradox can explain why the member states could agree only 
on a dangerously limited form of fiscal risk sharing. These limitations materialised in 
the recent financial and euro area crisis, in which the rescue of insolvent banks 
remained a task for each member state even though financial market integration had 
contributed to making domestic banking systems too big for most of them. But the 
elements of insurance that have been institutionalised in the monetary union also 
came to the fore in the crisis: notably the cross-border payments system TARGET 
sustained the euro area as a trade and payments area. The banking union has made 
risk sharing in the common currency area more robust. But the risk of fiscal 
overstretch is still real and calls for further reforms.  
 
Zusammenfassung: Der Euro ist ein historisch einmaliges Experiment: eine Gruppe 
sehr unterschiedlicher Länder hat sich freiwillig eine gemeinsame Währung 
gegeben; die supranationale Geldpolitik ist von nationalen Fiskalpolitiken bewusst 
geschieden. Es gab für jedes Mitgliedsland gute Gründe, dieses Experiment eines 
geldpolitischen Pools diverser Länderrisiken zu wagen. Allerdings hat das 
Experiment bisher eher enttäuscht. Ein polit-ökonomisches Paradoxon kann 
erklären, warum die Mitgliedsländer sich lediglich auf eine fiskalisch gefährlich 
begrenzte Risikoteilung einigen konnten. Diese Grenzen zeigten sich in der jüngsten 
Finanz- und Euroraumkrise, in der die Rettung insolventer Banken eine Aufgabe für 
Nationalstaaten blieb, obwohl die Finanzmarktintegration das Bankensystem für 
viele zu gross werden liess. In der Krise zeigten sich aber auch die 
institutionalisierten Versicherungselemente, die den Euroraum gerettet haben, z.B. 
das grenzüberschreitende Zahlungssystem TARGET. Die Bankenunion hat die 
Risikoteilung im gemeinsamen Währungsraum robuster gemacht. Allerdings ist das 
Risiko der Überlastung öffentlicher Haushalte weiterhin hoch. 
 
JEL Classifications: E42 Monetary systems; E44 Financial markets and the 
macroeconomy; E58 Central banks and their policies; F55 International institutional 
arrangements 
Key words: euro area, financial crisis, monetary integration theory; risk-sharing 
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1 INTRODUCTION: REVISITING THE EURO EXPERIMENT 
We live through one of the greatest monetary experiments of all times. The member 
states of the European monetary union are much more diverse in terms of income, 
size and political-economic structure than those of any other contemporary monetary 
union. The members of the euro area joined voluntarily. In monetary matters, they let 
themselves now be ruled and monitored by a supranational bureaucracy that has 
neither a budget to incentivise them nor the means of force to coerce them. The euro 
is a money in which the issuing central bank is completely ‘divorced’ from any tax-
transfer state.1 
None of these complexities have made it into our thinking about European monetary 
integration, except as reasons for why the euro area had a crisis. Our thinking is still 
governed by the time-honoured theory of ‘optimum currency areas’ that does not 
speak to central banking, monetary policy and the financial system.2 This theory is all 
about labour and product market flexibility. It envisages regional fiscal transfers when 
member states have given up exchange rates, which are seen as a well-functioning 
and perfectly controllable instrument of adjustment.3 Diversity of member states does 
play a role, although primarily as an obstacle to irrevocably fixing exchange rates. A 
currency area is defined as a fixed exchange rate system rather than a monetary 
system.  
The political economy of monetary solidarity tries to understand why a diverse union 
of formally sovereign nations could ever come about and how it could be maintained 
under the most extreme stress test. This is not a deductive but a theoretically guided 
empirical research programme. The idea of European monetary integration was first 
seriously pursued when the Bretton Woods system broke down in 1971 and a decade 
of high inflation, low growth and financial turmoil followed. After numerous attempts at 
managing exchange rates to achieve stability, policymakers decided to deal with the 
risks of exchange rate volatility by adopting a common hard currency. This would, they 
hoped, abolish exchange rates as a source of turmoil, and thereby achieve lower 
inflation and lower risk premia on interest rates.  This amounts to forming an insurance 
pool for certain macroeconomic shocks.4 An insurance rationale can also make sense 
of the diversity of membership: if members are subject to different risks, they can help 
each other when some of them fall on hard times while others do not. Risk sharing 
and diversification may not have been the original purpose of institutions that support 
the common currency; rather, they are a by-product of committing to low inflation. But 
under the stress test of a severe crisis, these hidden insurance properties of 
institutions can be revealed and activated. If the members then accept or at least 
tolerate these risk sharing properties of monetary institutions, I call that monetary 
solidarity. 
The era of national currencies in Continental Europe came to an end in 1998. The 
exchange rates between the original 11 members were fixed in 1999 and the common 
currency physically introduced in 12 countries on 1 January 2002. Greece was 
admitted later because its inflation was too high for the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, but markets endorsed the move with strong appreciation of the drachma. 
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Throughout the next two decades, more EU member states joined the common 
currency area, starting with Slovenia in 2007, followed by Cyprus and Malta in 2008. 
Slovakia and the Baltic states came in after the financial crisis had started. In particular 
the Baltic states made repeated and ultimately successful efforts to join regardless of 
the severe bond market crisis in the euro area. At the time of writing, in August 2018, 
the euro area has 19 members.  
What is striking about this very short history of the euro area is the fact that the process 
was so relentless. With hindsight, we may wonder why such a motley assortment of 
countries wanted to take part in a monetary experiment, the outcome of which was 
inherently uncertain.  And why did the queue for joining not disappear when the euro 
area entered an existential crisis in 2010? There was no automatism in this. The queue 
got only somewhat shorter: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland revised their 
plans to join any time soon. The next section tries to solve the puzzle why the euro 
looked like a good idea to 19 very different countries.  
The good idea materialised in the sense of a stable, initially not very hard currency 
with low interest rates for all members. In that sense, the experiment had delivered 
what it promised. The effects on growth and investment were much harder to pin down 
and varied from country to country. But at half time of its existence, in September 2008, 
the euro area experienced first a banking crisis that spread throughout the world’s rich 
North Atlantic hemisphere and then entered a sovereign debt crisis phase that seemed 
to be confined to a few euro area member states. To this very day, there is a debate 
on whether it was the fiscal and financial irresponsibility of member states like Greece 
and Ireland or a systemic problem of the euro area that caused the crisis. It almost led 
to the breakup of the young currency area in mid-2012.  
The third section below argues that the crisis indeed revealed a systemic problem of 
the euro experiment. The limitations on risk sharing between member states that the 
architects of the euro area consciously introduced can generate negative feedback 
loops between the domestic banking system and national public finances. If one has 
this systemic interpretation, then one also needs to explain why these dangerous 
limitations were introduced in the first place and what helped to prevent the 
catastrophic scenario which could have ensued from this. 
The euro area has undergone massive reforms, with emergency funds that dwarf the 
lending capacity of the International Monetary Fund and a banking union that makes 
the ECB the largest bank regulator and supervisor in the Basel Committee. These 
reforms have been extremely contentious. Emergency lending comes with heavy-
handed and intrusive conditions of structural reform and fiscal retrenchment attached. 
The ‘beneficiaries’ of this treatment complain about the severe hardship that one-sided 
adjustment imposes, not matched by equally heavy-handed treatment of the banks in 
creditor countries. The countries that guarantee the emergency lending in turn 
complain about the fiscal risks on their taxpayers and consider refusing to participate: 
the Slovakian government refused to take part in the first bailout programme for 
Greece. The banking union is less contentious but criticised by some for being too little 
too late while others see it as already going too far in regulation and the socialisation 
of risks. The fourth section evaluates the reforms in light of the earlier diagnosis of a 
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fragile system. It has arguably become more robust but it remains crisis-prone – and 
we have to explain why the member states left it at that.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
By way of conclusion, I discuss the apparent need to complete the monetary union 
with a fiscal union and consider the political down-side of monetary solidarity euro 
area-style. While I find that there is more risk-sharing than meets the eye, not meeting 
the eye of the general public and even government members is a considerable political 
problem. This reinforces the view that the maxim of monetary integration must be to 
maintain political unity in economic diversity rather than pushing for ever closer union. 
 
2 WHY THE EURO LOOKED LIKE A GOOD IDEA 
It is worth recalling that governments did not sleep-walk into adopting the euro under 
fair weather conditions but integrated against the odds of voter scepticism and market 
disbelief. This is the significance of the 1992-3 crisis of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM). The economic background was that the fall of the Iron Curtain and 
German unification in 1990 had given a boost to European economies which led to 
divergent inflation rates. In order to keep the fixed, but adjustable, exchange rate 
parities, central banks would have to increase interest rates. These were extremely 
high in Germany because the Bundesbank, true to form, was concerned about the 
inflationary potential of the unification process. Matching these interest rates would 
have killed off the post-unification boom that Europe enjoyed after the lacklustre 
growth of previous years. A fairly public dispute between central banks arose about 
the best way to proceed: should Germany accept more inflation or should others adjust 
with a realignment of exchange rates?  
The turmoil in foreign exchange markets was triggered by political events. The Danish 
people rejected the Maastricht Treaty in June and the French barely adopted it in 
September 1992. Market investors interpreted this as voters being unwilling to put up 
with demand-restraining policies geared to maintaining the existing parities. Hence, 
they started to sell currencies of those countries that, in the event of a forced 
alignment, were likely to devalue most – and thus enforced the alignment. On Black 
Wednesday, 15 September 1992, the British Pound and the Italian lira were forced out 
of the ERM. In August 1993, the band of 2.25% around a central rate had to be 
widened to 15% because the French franc came again under severe pressure. 
Economists debated the economic causes of the crisis between September 1992 and 
August 1993 intensely. 5  Was this a self-fulfilling speculative attack by financial 
investors as Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz argued in a widely cited 
Brookings Paper on Economic Activity? After all, market signals were quite confused 
and proved later to be wrong on countries’ willingness to maintain demand-
constraining policies. The Spanish peseta was under appreciation pressure in the 
ERM only days before it was massively sold. The speculation against the parity grid 
started when adjustment policies were well under way, not earlier. Later, Italy defied 
expectations in that the Banca d’Italia kept its high interest rates even after the 
currency had been forced out of the ERM. The French economy outperformed the 
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German economy for several years in terms of lower inflation, a more balanced budget 
and current account surpluses (Germany ran deficits during those years).  
Others like William Branson defended the Bundesbank position and argued that it was 
the fault of ERM members who refused to adjust to the shock of German unification 
with exchange rate alignment. He had the standard macroeconomic textbook on his 
side. The late Rüdiger Dornbusch blamed cumulative losses of competitiveness vis-
à-vis Germany that created devaluation pressures and sudden overshooting 
exchange rates, which eventually lead to adjustment when wages and prices are not 
entirely flexible. These explanations were plausible for Italy and to a lesser extent the 
UK and Spain, but definitely not France. But what was not easily compatible with these 
real economy explanations was the fact that two countries outside the ERM, notably 
Sweden and Finland, experienced even worse currency, fiscal and banking crises. 
This debate matters greatly for how we diagnose the ERM crisis: if Branson and 
Dornbusch were right, the crisis since 2010 was a foreseeable outcome. The ERM 
crisis was then the last warning shot that, in the view of critics like Martin Feldstein, 
out-of-touch cosmopolitan elites chose to ignore in order to pursue a grand integration 
project directed against US hegemony. If Eichengreen and Wyplosz were right, the 
euro area crisis was part of a larger financial crisis to which the world economy with 
its oversized financial markets and liberalised capital flows have become quite prone 
to. The EU had started liberalising capital movements in 1990. 
It is perfectly sensible to criticise the introduction of the euro for being such a leap into 
the unknown, given that leaping out is nearly impossible because it will be prohibitively 
costly. But can we explain the decision only by the cosmopolitan aspirations of out-of-
touch elites or governments being captured by transnational business, which wanted 
to enlarge their markets? I think governments and citizens in very different European 
countries had plausible reasons for why they wanted to join the euro area for national 
and individual reasons. And they could endorse membership in good faith, ie not with 
the intention of offloading public debt onto others (an accusation against Italy and 
Greece) or  locking others for ever into their overvalued real exchange rates so as to 
maintain current account surpluses in all eternity (an accusation against Germany, 
although interestingly never against the Netherlands or Belgium).  
The first good and perfectly honourable reason for joining the euro area was that the 
ERM crisis could be seen as a warning shot about the lack of monetary sovereignty in 
a world of liberalised financial markets. Country-specific shocks had been transmitted 
via exchange rates. Germany, the country causing them, was hardly affected but 
became the safe haven of financial flows. This was the theory of optimum currency 
areas turned upside down. It demonstrated to most governments that they had to 
follow the Bundesbank’s policy stance and were exposed to unpredictable financial 
shocks that were damaging the non-financial economy. So a currency regime that 
weakened Germany’s monetary power and eliminated a major transmission 
mechanism of instability was not merely a French obsession but a perfectly legitimate 
national interest of most ERM members. It was exactly their being different from 
Germany that made them seek currency unification, while the Netherlands with its peg 
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to the D-Mark was not a driving force. But even the Netherlands was wary of the 
turbulences that accompanied speculation about realignments in the ERM and, like 
Germany, warmed to the idea of generalised monetary stability.6 
The second reason was that central bankers came to see the advantages of less 
volatile and lower interest rates. EU President Delors had put them into the driving 
seat of monetary integration, not because they were cosmopolitan Euro enthusiasts 
but because they were economically literate sceptics with an institutional role in 
national policy-making to lose. During the inflationary 1970s, monetary stability had 
become a strong value of economic policy-making, because it also seemed to 
underpin growth. This new emphasis raised the status of central bankers. Delors knew 
that if they would not be brought on board, central bankers could derail the whole 
project. In fact, Margaret Thatcher firmly expected that central bankers would do the 
blocking for her and was furious when she discovered that the Bank of England 
governor had adopted the problem-solving attitude of a technocrat on the Delors 
Committee.7 Volatile interest rates can easily topple banks that have a mismatch 
between, for instance, fixed rate assets and adjustable rate liabilities. High interest 
rates politicise monetary policy because every move at high levels makes credit 
prohibitively expensive which deters prudent investors, while the effect on inflation 
becomes weaker as economic growth is less based on credit.                                                                                                                                               
For related reasons, organised labour and non-financial employers in most 
prospective member states welcomed a currency regime that promised lower interest 
rates. This does not only lower the financial system’s ‘tax’ on investment, it also gives 
the market signal that investments can take more time to amortise. This is typically 
better for technological progress and the quality of investment projects than if firms 
are forced to liquidate their investments quickly. So even in countries with corporatist 
labour markets, important stakeholders would support the European integration 
process. With some modification, this reasoning applied to Germany since a common 
central bank promised to be less narrowly focused on German inflation.  
Last but not least, Treasuries welcomed the prospect of gaining fiscal room for 
manoeuvre with lower interest costs on public debt and longer maturities of 
government bonds. In a talk at LSE, the Portuguese finance minister once said that 
the day after Portugal was officially declared to be among the first members of the 
euro area, the country could issue its first 15 year bond. The following graph shows 
one of these tangible benefits. 
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Fig. 1: Long-term government bond yields, 1992-2017 
 
Source: Eurostat, EMU convergence criteria series 
So there were good reasons for joining the euro area. But they were not the same for 
every member. They may even have changed for each country over the course of the 
decade when the euro was phased in, notably with the ideological leaning of the 
government of the day. For instance, the Maastricht Treaty with its liberalising thrust 
was drawn up under a majority of Conservative administrations in member states that 
wanted to redefine the role of the state. When the euro was finally introduced in 1999-
2001, there was a majority of ‘new’ Social-Democratic governments in power, and this 
saw the EU sign up to a Lisbon Agenda of creating a competitive social Europe that 
was meant to complement the Economic and Monetary Union. A union of democracies 
must allow for such changes in priorities. 
3 WHY THE EURO HAS DISAPPOINTED IN PRACTICE 
The euro has disappointed in an important respect, namely financial stability, and this 
section tries to explain why. But this does not mean the euro area has done badly in 
all other respects that citizens care about. Contrary to what some critics claim, there 
was income convergence before the crisis: convergence from below for the poorer 
member states and from above for the richer ones (Fig.2). There was not rising 
inequality across the board, especially not in the so-called periphery (Fig.3). Both can 
be related to the introduction of the euro: downward interest rate convergence leaves, 
in principle, more of national income to wage earners. The stronger the fall in interest 
rates was, the more this effect may be discernible. Obviously, there were other 
influences on income inequality, like labour market reforms, the decline of trade union 
representation in expanding service sectors or sheer rent extraction by owners and 
managers in oligopolistic industries.  
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Fig.2: Income convergence (EU-27 = 100), 1996-2016 
 
Source: Eurostat, GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parities 
Fig.3: Inequality of income after taxes and transfers 
Source: Eurostat, Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income, 0=maximum equality, 
100=maximum inequality 
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But what went wrong and led to a deep and long-lasting crisis? The answer to this 
question is twofold. First of all, diversity of membership is a mixed blessing in political-
economic terms. On the one hand, members with different risk profiles reduce the 
overall risk of an insurance pool and can support each other in a variety of ways. On 
the other hand, members that are very different may not trust each other and are 
therefore likely to agree only on minimal insurance.  
Related to this, secondly, was the fact that the euro is a money without a state.8 
Members did not want to create, right from the start, a United States of Europe with a 
federal budget; again, this seems a sensible decision, especially against the 
background of the history of the United States of America which was for a long time a 
(fiscal) state without a national money. Either way, this can easily lead to a particular 
form of financial instability. The question then arises what held the euro area together 
and provided insurance for those member states that were particularly affected by 
financial market panic? 
 
3.1 WHY DIVERSITY IS A MIXED BLESSING  
The fact that the euro area started with a relatively large and heterogeneous 
membership and keeps on expanding is a noteworthy fact. From my perspective, this 
makes good economic sense but it is politically the more difficult integration path. 
Mutual insurance is more beneficial, the more diverse and larger the pool of risks. If 
diversity means negative correlation of risks, then the whole (aggregate risk) is less 
than the sum of its parts (risk of members). Also, if members hardly ever fall on hard 
times at the same time or in the same way, the lucky are better able to support the 
unlucky.  But insurance also rests on trust as it increases interdependence: the bad 
luck of one member is shared by all. The lucky insurance providers therefore always 
have an incentive to question the merit of an insurance claim. The more different the 
unlucky members are, the more likely is this questioning. We have seen this in the 
crisis: Southern European countries were criticised for not having well-regulated 
labour markets even though labour markets had nothing to do with the financial 
crisis.Their welfare state were seen as too generous even though they tend to be low 
social spenders. They were accused of having uncompetitive industries even though 
this is certainly not true for Cyprus, Ireland and Spain.9  
One can summarise this phenomenon in a political-economic paradox of diversity: the 
more diverse the membership of an insurance pool, the more beneficial it is 
economically but also the more difficult it is to realise its potential for risk sharing 
politically. The paradox can be solved by noting that the insurance properties of 
institutions, like a common currency, the common central bank or a cross-border 
payments system, may be a by-product of national incentives: reining in the 
dominance of the Bundesbank, getting cheaper credit for investors and the Treasury, 
preventing inflation-prone countries from devaluing abruptly etc. Explicit political 
agreement on the principle of insurance may not be needed, if risk-sharing institutions 
can be the by-product of national interests.  
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Risk can be shared in many ways, especially between states. For instance trade can 
be a macroeconomic stabiliser of business and employment: in a recession, domestic 
firms can tide their business over a period of low demand by selling (more profitably) 
abroad; in a boom, firms can get inputs more cheaply or quickly from abroad. Keeping 
borders for imports open is a kind of (regulatory) insurance that requires solidarity 
because most capitalist economies have some slack in labour markets in normal 
times, so imports are seen as rivalrous to domestic employment. Countries will 
maintain open borders if they trust that their neighbour will keep borders open when 
their firms need it. And this requires very little solidarity; it is not even perceived as 
insurance when the two trading countries have asynchronous business cycles, so that 
one tends to have a boom when the other is in recession and vice versa.  
It is not clear whether a flexible exchange rate could help to make trade a better 
insurance mechanism, even if we could assume that exchange rates would reliably 
work to balance trade – a big if. A depreciating currency for the country in recession 
would reinforce the ability to sell abroad but hurt domestic income further while it would 
feed the boom of the booming economy through cheap imports. An appreciating 
currency for the country in recession would stabilise domestic incomes but hurt the 
competitiveness of firms while it would increase the bottlenecks in the booming 
economy and feed inflation. Stable exchange rates seem to be a good compromise 
between these conflicting supply and demand effects. Besides, exchange rates have 
proven to be determined by financial markets and not goods markets. This ‘discovery’ 
in the modern theory of exchange rates made the father of the theory of optimum 
currency areas, Robert Mundell, revoke his support for the theory and advocate the 
introduction of an improved gold standard.10    
Some useful economic research was done on inter-state and intra-state risk sharing 
before the euro area started.11 It studied how much output volatility in a country could 
be smoothed through financial markets in contrast to fiscal transfers. Smoothing here 
means that the output shock, for instance bad weather or an oil price surge, does not 
translate fully into corresponding volatility of income and consumption of households. 
The economic reasoning can be illustrated with a stylised example.  
Let us assume we have a federation that consists of three states that are economically 
specialised:12 state A is specialised in agriculture, state M in manufacturing and state 
T in tourism. An exceptionally hot and dry summer leads to an output fall of 20 percent 
in agriculture, hardly any effect on manufacturing and a 5 percent rise in income from 
tourism. Trade can help state A in the sense that less supply of agricultural goods 
makes their prices rise; to what extent this compensates for the farmers’ fall in 
production depends on the extent to which imports can substitute for domestic 
agricultural products. And there are other risk sharing channels: in a monetary union, 
financial markets are integrated. This means that financial wealth, for households 
typically savings deposits, pension funds, and life insurance policies are invested 
across the federation. So their value does not fall in A and rise in T, it rises or falls for 
all, depending on how big A, M and T are relative to each other. This can smooth 
consumption in A for households with such wealth. If there is a fiscal federation, state 
A will pay less income tax and receive some transfers, while T pays more income tax 
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and receives less transfers. . It is quite likely that not all volatility is absorbed and 
households in A experience a fall in income that will make them reduce consumption, 
for instance postpone the purchase of new cars from M and take shorter holidays in 
T. The opposite holds for residents in T, they will consume a bit more (although not as 
much more as if they had not shared the bad luck with A).  
The first estimates of how much financial and fiscal risk sharing channels contribute 
to the smoothing of an output shock were done for states in the United States. It found 
that almost two thirds of an output shock that hits one state is absorbed by private 
capital and credit markets, less than 20 percent by the tax-transfer system, and at 
most 3 percent by labour migration. The rest is not smoothed, so the shock leads to 
changes in consumption. The conclusion for the euro area was that financial market 
integration would do the trick of risk sharing and a federal budget was not of the 
essence.   
This research was useful in that it took the standard scenario of the optimum currency 
area approach to monetary integration, here: an output shock that had asymmetric 
effects on these states. But instead of concluding that therefore they need an 
exchange rate between them, the researchers asked how this risk of country-specific 
shocks can be diversified, which should be the obvious question that any economist 
asks. After all, the absurd consequence of the standard theory is that we need many 
more different currencies in the world: California and Texas are certainly not optimally 
combined in one currency area, especially since a Texan worker in the oil industry 
cannot easily become a techy in Silicon Valley, and vice versa. London would certainly 
need its own currency as it is economically quite different from the rest of the UK. 
But a number of objections can be raised against the argument that financial market 
integration will absorb and smooth shocks.13 First of all, the focus on output shocks 
systematically underestimates the insurance function of welfare states, which tend to 
stabilise demand shocks, such as the  income shocks that arise from cyclical 
unemployment that tend to depress consumer spending. The financial crisis since 
2008 was a demand shock: falling house prices depressed household consumption 
and income and through that then affected firms’ output negatively. Different risk-
sharing mechanisms were activated; for example bank bailouts protected savers and 
stabilised their wealth, while making fiscal deficits soar. Moreover, public risk sharing 
channels tend to be more progressive than private market-based risk-sharing. Welfare 
states stabilising lower incomes relatively more, while private market channels protect 
those with diversified wealth. Last but not least, it is somewhat misleading to analyse 
only the risk-absorbing capacity of financial markets when they have generated so 
much mayhem and volatility in recent decades.14  
Financial market integration has been the Achilles heel of macroeconomic stability 
ever since the financial liberalisation of the 1980s. This is a bitter irony and a clear 
failure, given that the idea of European monetary integration was born as an anti-dote 
to financial turmoil, in the guise of exchange rate instability after the demise of the 
dollar standard of Bretton Woods. 
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3.2 WHY MONEY WITHOUT A STATE IS FINANCIALLY UNSTABLE 
The euro area has a unique feature: it is a monetary union without a fiscal union. In 
economic terms, a fiscal union would mean, above all, a central budget at the EU level 
that can go into deficit and thus stabilise the euro area’s economy in a recession. At 
present, the EU budget resembles that of an international organisation that has to be 
balanced annually and has no built-in stabilisers of the business cycle, such as an 
income tax or unemployment benefits. But we need to ask whether this standard role 
of modern public finances, a stabilising function for income and employment, is really 
what is missing in the euro area. 
To recall what erupted in a financial crisis in 2007-8: the collapsing subprime markets 
in the US made banks stop lending to each other in the wholesale markets in which 
huge quantities of liquidity are traded. Banks stopped lending to each other because 
they suspected the other side had assets on their balance sheets which would default 
when called, especially those asset-backed securities where the asset backing was 
uncertain. This mistrust then acquired self-fulfilling properties and spread from the 
subprime to other markets. As banks were short of liquidity, they had to sell assets, 
which led to a fall in their prices; more assets had to be sold to raise needed liquidity. 
Even sound banks would therefore see the market value of their asset side shrink 
while their labilities did not fall in the same way. It is at this point where a lender of last 
resort is needed: to stop the fire sale of assets undermining every financial institution 
in the system.  
When the crisis first became apparent in European money markets, in summer 2007, 
more than a year before the crash of Lehman Brothers, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) acted with extraordinary liquidity measures. It fulfilled its role as a lender of last 
resort to a fairly integrated financial system even though this role is not defined in the 
ECB’s statute. The problem for all central banks soon became the fact that not all 
borrowing by banks was for liquidity reasons. They had indeed made bad investments 
and some of them were insolvent, meaning they had foreseeably more liabilities than 
assets even if normal times would resume. The UK Treasury had to nationalise the 
Royal Bank of Scotland and other parts of the British banking system because they 
were not illiquid but insolvent. The Bank of England refused to lend without 
restructuring in such cases and instead bought government bonds directly from the 
Treasury, so as to leave the markets in no doubt that the UK government would have 
the means to sustain this strain on public finances. 
But there was no EU budget that could release the ECB from the role of lender-of-last-
resort to insolvent banks. Nor could the ECB do what the Bank of England did for the 
Treasury, namely monetise public debt directly, which is explicitly prohibited in the 
ECB statute.15 In the beginning, member state governments intervened early on to bail 
out parts of the domestic banking system (which can include subsidiaries of foreign 
banks). Since the mid-1980s, banks’ balance sheets have become huge relative to 
national economies, however. In the EU, this was certainly driven by the Single Market 
of relatively unencumbered capital flows. Ireland, which was once among the member 
states with the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios, became one with a very high debt 
ratio almost overnight. The government decided in October 2008 to underwrite the 
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balance sheets of six Irish banks in their entirety and was forced by EU non-
discrimination rules to extend the guarantee to foreign subsidiaries. Public debt 
exploded almost everywhere. The German government had to do one of the biggest 
bailout programmes for its banks.  
Then came the Greek and all subsequent crises which followed one pattern: a 
negative feedback loop between weak banks and precarious public finances. It can 
start with either: in Greece, the overindebted government became suddenly a concern 
for nervous investors in 2009. The trigger was one of those spectacles when Greek 
governments change: an incoming administration blames the previous administration 
for understating the dire state of public finances. It can then only get better under the 
new government. But this time, investors took fright. As Greek bonds were sold off, 
domestic banks holding them suffered losses. The banks had been one of the most 
solid parts of the Greek economy, but they became a cause for concern, calling for the 
government to bail out some of them. In Ireland and Spain, market panic started with 
banks that suffered from the bust of the housing markets. In Cyprus, the banks took a 
big hit from the write-down of Greek debt into which they had invested heavily, 
speculating on another bailout. And Portugal was a victim of the deep recession that 
burdened its banks with non-performing loans, while public finances struggled with 
collapsing tax revenues. In all cases, governments holding bank assets (from bailouts) 
and domestic banks holding government bonds (increasingly so because foreign 
investors withdrew) set up a spiral of falling bank asset and bond prices with the result 
of both being shut out of market refinancing.  
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Fig. 4: Crisis countries in the feedback loop between private and public finances  
 
 
 
Source: Schelkle (2017) 
These different entry points with a common pattern suggest that there is a systemic 
problem which goes beyond the weaknesses of single countries. This is not to deny 
that Greece had an unsustainable fiscal policy. The Council of heads of state could 
have allowed it to default, had there not been the anxiety that this would lead to a 
second Lehman moment; it was in particular the US administration that implored the 
European Council not to exercise its policy of no-bailout.16 Nor does this analysis deny 
that if the living standard of Portuguese citizens is to keep up with the EU average, 
firms will have to raise the productivity of employment and the government improve 
the national education system. Authorities in Cyprus, Ireland and Spain must decide 
whether they want the well-being of citizens to depend so much on the performance 
of an oversized banking system. But all these criticisms also mean that these are very 
different cases and there is not one ‘Southern European’ malaise. Every country in the 
euro area could have become the target of a bond market panic: if one had allowed 
Greece to fail, huge losses for Cypriot, French and German banks would have raised 
the spectre of major bank failures in each new bond market crisis. The contagion could 
have spread very quickly and would not necessarily be confined to the euro area; it 
could reach the UK because its banking system held large claims on Ireland and 
elsewhere.17 
These diabolic loops are symptoms of missing institutions that can interrupt the 
feedback mechanisms. Many observers argue that the major missing institution is a 
federal budget. Hence, one might ask whether the currency was introduced 
prematurely, instead of waiting for a common budget to be adopted first. The 
appropriate sequencing of real and monetary integration was intensely discussed 
Greece 1 
Portugal 
Spain 
Ireland 
Cyprus Greece 2 
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before the euro was introduced. It came closest to a debate about the optimality of the 
currency area to be created. The so-called coronation approach to monetary 
integration was highly critical and maintained that the prospective members should 
first converge in real economic terms. The usual suspects, the Bundesbank and 
German economists, saw the euro in those terms: a crown to be put on the head of an 
ever closer union once it had developed fully first. The misleadingly so-called 
monetarist approach claimed that the common currency would itself bring about real 
convergence, above all through more intense trade, and thus be itself a lever to ever 
closer union. Another contingent of usual suspects were in this camp, above all French 
politicians and the federalists of all nations.18 
There was little discussion on whether a central euro area budget should be introduced 
at the same time as the common currency. But those in favour of coronation who 
promoted a more evolutionary approach in line with economic orthodoxy often referred 
to the United States as an example. The US had a national finance minister since the 
late 18th century (Alexander Hamilton was the first), and, thanks to several wars, a 
federal budget and national public debt management were introduced long before the 
US had a national currency (the Greenback in 1861) and a permanent central bank 
(the Federal Reserve in 1913). Two previous attempts at introducing a central bank 
failed as the states resented this concentration of power at the federal level.  
The US provides actually very little supporting evidence for the coronation script. It is 
a counter-example. The United States was the financially most unstable country of the 
Western hemisphere from the 19th century until the Great Depression. 19  Similar 
negative feedback loops between banks and state budgets occurred that we observed 
in the euro area crisis.20 What ended the susceptibility to these diabolic loops was not 
a federal budget but a federal resolution authority and deposit guarantor invested in 
Treasury bonds, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The no-bailout 
imperative has been observed since the 1840s, when Northern states resisted a third 
bailout of indebted states in the South for their overinvestment in infrastructure. The 
national money that was eventually introduced was a currency imposed by the North 
in the midst of the civil war, without the consent of delegates from the South that had 
withdrawn from national representative bodies. Creating a state without a national 
money, as the US did, was a rocky road to ever closer union, financially and politically 
much more precarious than the EU trajectory. 
 
3.3 HOW THE EURO AREA SURVIVED: AN EXAMPLE 
What stopped the diabolic loop, as the negative feedback loop in the previous crisis is 
often called, from spiralling out of control? Only a non-market actor with deep pockets 
can stop such a destructive process. Absent a joint European resolution capacity, this 
left only the ECB in the first instance. Its lending and bond-buying programmes had to 
become ever bigger, however, as governments became ever more reluctant to 
recapitalise their banking systems. The bond market crises did not exactly encourage 
them to get a grip. It has become common to lecture Europe about the need to be as 
bold as the US Treasury but most European governments did not enjoy the privilege 
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of a safe haven status for their bonds. Europeans felt more like emerging markets at 
the mercy of uncontrollable and arbitrary forces, that punished the victims rather than 
the major culprit. 
Moreover, bank bailouts were not popular with electorates who felt the crisis in terms 
of unemployment, cuts to public services and generally the struggle of making ends 
meet when real incomes stagnated or even declined. This is a perfectly 
understandable gut feeling. But bank bailouts also assured savers that they can get 
their savings back and it is almost a miracle how little savers lost in bank defaults. 
Unfortunately for policymakers, the bank runs that did not happen also barely 
registered as an achievement. This left the ECB in a precarious position: it could not 
withdraw its liquidity support since an unknown number of zombie banks depended on 
it and the economic recovery in the euro area was very uneven. Withdrawing the life 
support could have created mayhem, depending on how many and how big those in 
intensive care were. But the vast amount of liquidity the ECB created found its way in 
the next stock market bubble, as well as tiding over banks that should be closed or 
restructured. The ECB found creative ways of providing cheap liquidity to banks, in the 
hope that they could earn a margin and rebuild their balance sheets out of this profit. 
In this sense, the member states forced the ECB to a quasi-fiscal policy of 
recapitalising the banking system. But in contrast to a legislated programme, the 
central bank could not attach many strings to such a favourable deal, such as a cap 
on the remuneration of managers.21 
Another institution of central banking was, in my view, the single most important 
insurance mechanism, compensating for the sudden stop of capital flows even when 
all else failed. This was the TARGET system for clearing among the euro area’s 
banks.22 However, most residents did not notice it and those who did were spooked 
by a freakish German campaign about a TARGET ‘trap’ that started with a legitimate 
question and ended with the most outlandish allegations of a conspiracy against 
German taxpayers.23 The legitimate question was why TARGET suddenly showed 
large imbalances: the Bundesbank amassed claims against the TARGET system of 
hundreds of billions of euro while Spain and Italy were in deficit to the same degree. 
This triggered a public-spirited debate on the Internet to which some of the brightest 
minds, including a Federal Reserve banker, contributed to explain what was not 
exactly news: that interbank markets were frozen and TARGET imbalances acted as 
a substitute for failing markets. The US cross-district payments system showed similar 
imbalances.24 
TARGET is a platform for registered users with access to central bank reserves, 
typically wholesale and retail commercial banks, to make payments to each other. 
Such payments systems act like clearing houses, which is one of the historical origins 
of central banks: instead of each bank having to entertain an account with every other 
bank in order to process payments, they have an account with that clearing house. 
The ECB created a cross-border system for the Eurosystem to have a technically 
robust and uniform way of implementing its monetary policy. While banks are not 
required to use TARGET and could use private-commercial alternatives instead, 
TARGET became the preferred platform in private transactions. Non-euro banks, for 
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instance from the UK, also participate in TARGET with their subsidiaries in the euro 
area. 
To take one step back: we should all wonder why bank customers in the euro area, 
individuals as well as firms, never experienced an interruption of payment flows even 
though wholesale banking markets were frozen and banks refused to acquire claims 
on (lend to) each other. A banking crisis normally spreads into the real economy and 
via trade across borders because payments are no longer processed and people must 
take resort to foreign currency that their own central bank cannot generate.  Avoiding 
such a situation by maintaining the payments system is ultimately the reason why a 
central bank acts as lender of last resort to particular firms in the economy, ie banks 
with a license and therefore an account at the central bank.  
Let’s assume, a wine merchant in Belgium wants to import Austrian wine. Obviously, 
the merchant wants to finance the import using her bank in Belgium and the vineyard 
owner wants to be paid into his account in Austria. Upon instruction from the customer, 
the Belgian import bank debits the account holding merchant and instructs the euro 
area’s cross-border payments system TARGET to transfer deposits the bank holds 
with the Belgian central bank (or to take an overdraft against collateral) and credit the 
account of the Austrian export bank at the Austrian central bank; the vineyard owner 
will then be paid. In normal times, the Austrian bank may now consider that it holds 
excess reserves with its central bank given the payment it received. Excess reserves 
carry a low interest rate and it may be able to lend it at a slightly higher interest rate in 
the interbank market. In the simplest case, the Belgian bank is in a matching position 
and tries to replenish its reserves or replace its borrowing from the central bank if 
borrowing is more expensive than what it has to pay in the interbank market. Thus, in 
normal times we would end up with a claim of banks against each other, contracted in 
the interbank market, while they had initially a claim and a credit from the Eurosystem 
that operates TARGET.  
What we learned in the crisis is that this payments system distinguishes a monetary 
union from a fixed exchange rate system.25 It eliminates the need for holding exchange 
reserves and thus prevents a disruption of payments even when the interbank market, 
which in a monetary union has absorbed the foreign exchange market, does not 
operate normally. This happened as early as 2007-8. Banks with excess reserves 
(Austrian in the example above) did not want to lend any more to banks with a liquidity 
deficit (Belgian in the example above). Such ‘disequilibria’ in liquidity positions can 
have many reasons and are only loosely related to current account deficits and 
surpluses. In the crisis, all banks suddenly felt they had to hold more liquidity. By 
holding all and ever more liquidity reserves in the central bank, they offloaded the 
perceived credit risk in other banks to their central bank.  
Once the banking crisis turned into a European sovereign debt crisis in early 2010, 
there were massive capital account transactions, including deposit flight out of Greece 
and Italy. Because interbank lending had ceased, the balances in the payments 
system were no longer reversed after the payment had been made; instead they 
accumulated with central banks. TARGET then lent to banks in countries with liquidity 
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deficits, and borrowed from countries with excess reserves. The consolidated central 
bank balance of the Eurosystem thus showed that it had become the interbank market 
maker of last resort:26 This fulfills an insurance function comparable to unemployment 
benefits: just as the latter replaces earnings from paid work (the labour market), so did 
the TARGET balances replace the capital flows necessary to process payments.  
The consolidated balance sheet of TARGET, or specifically the Eurosystem, thus got 
larger. To take our example, the central bank of Austria accumulated claims and the 
central bank of Belgium accumulated liabilities vis-à-vis TARGET. The banks resident 
in Belgium, unable to obtain interbank credit, can in turn replenish their reserves 
thanks to the extraordinary monetary interventions that the imminent financial collapse 
forced the ECB to undertake. These were interventions like the fixed rate full allotment 
policy which allowed banks to borrow as much as they wished at an interest rate 
determined by the ECB. The only limit imposed on Belgian banks would be the 
availability of eligible collateral (securities to be pledged with a discount or ‘haircut’), a 
constraint that in the ECB applied uniformly to banks in the euro area irrespective of 
the country they were located in and for which standards were progressively lowered 
during the crisis.  
This collateral policy of the ECB was another example of the risk pooling that a 
common central bank can and did perform.27 It benefitted those member states which 
were suddenly seen as risky by market investors, for more or less valid reasons that 
could become self-fulfilling. In that sense, risk sharing is also risk prevention, a simple 
point that Wolfgang Schäuble and his main advisor, Ludger Schuknecht, failed or 
refused to grasp.  
TARGET is a good example of monetary solidarity. When a crisis hits, it makes sense 
for all parties involved to compensate those most affected by it. Despite the ‘accident’ 
in the financial system, trade can still proceed, benefitting importing and exporting 
firms alike. Even capital and deposit flight can take place, in fact more easily, by those 
frightened to lose their assets in a bank default, without leaving the currency area itself; 
they can therefore also quickly return as soon as interbank markets start to function 
again. These are tangible insurance services to the real economy and the banking 
system that replaced markets when they failed systemicly. TARGET could act as a 
form of social insurance because all banks in the euro area had chosen to be its 
members.  
TARGET was not created to play this role. Most likely, this is why it was not obstructed 
by the political-economic paradox of diversity. The campaign in Germany against this 
arcane institution is evidence that political obstruction would have been an issue. The 
campaign’s cheerleader, Hans-Werner Sinn, wrote a book with the title ‘The Target 
trap’; the euro-sceptic party Alternative für Deutschland included his proposal for a cap 
on TARGET balances in its manifesto for the European Parliament elections, and a 
Bavarian tax payer association tried to bring a criminal case against the Bundesbank 
for running up TARGET balances, although the case was not admitted by the court. 
Stopping TARGET from working the way it does would have meant reversing the 
monetary union. There was a precedent for this in the United States during the Great 
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Depression, and it made the Depression worse.28 What the anti-TARGET campaign 
did, however, achieve was to trigger a concerted effort at rational explanation. This 
provided insight into its insurance properties and explicitly rejected any limitations of 
the insurance provided: it turned risk sharing by default into monetary solidarity that is 
acknowledged and appreciated, except by die-hard euro sceptics, of course. 
 
4 WHY THE EURO EXPERIMENT IS NOT DOOMED 
TARGET was obviously not the only institution that kept the euro area afloat. 
Extraordinary monetary policy interventions were another crucial factor. How crucial 
can be inferred from the fact that EU member states outside the euro area, like Latvia 
and Hungary, had to seek assistance from the IMF and the EU Commission almost 
immediately after Lehman’s collapse in September 2008, despite better 
macroeconomic indicators than Greece.29 Markets did not see those countries as part 
of the risk pool and took fright. Swap arrangements among major central banks as well 
as the Vienna initiative prevented major currency crises from developing: the threat 
was real enough, however, given the high foreign exchange debt that households and 
firms in many Central and Eastern European countries had. If their currencies had 
devalued abruptly, this debt would have increased in value and sent households and 
banks, many of them foreign subsidiaries, into insolvency. The effects could easily 
have spread to countries like Austria and Sweden with their high credit exposure to 
these economies. 
The EU and the euro area have gone through a phase of frantic institution building 
since 2009. While the immediate response to the crisis was ostentatious tightening of 
fiscal rules, with a supposedly muscular ‘Six Pack’ and a Fiscal Compact, the new 
rules have yet to be enforced. There are good reasons for not enforcing pro-cyclical 
rules when the economic recovery is so fragile. The rules tightening was very 
conspicuous and arguably more for domestic consumption in countries like Germany, 
the Netherlands and Finland with euro-sceptic popular movements. They have to be 
assured that moral hazard is kept under control, ie that there is no excessive risk-
taking now that we know that the no-bailout rule cannot be exercised when a systemic 
financial crisis erupts. But there were also two important innovations. First the 
permanent emergency funds amounted to fiscal capacity building, in contrast to the 
relentless emphasis on fiscal constraining; and second, the EU worked on tighter 
financial regulation that led eventually to a banking union for the euro area.  
 
4.1 HOW A FRAGILE SYSTEM WAS REFORMED 
The following graph gives an overview of how various innovations helped to interrupt 
the negative feedback loop between weak banks and weak government balance 
sheets. But I will concentrate on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the 
European Banking Union (EBU) only. My focus is on how the political-economic 
paradox has been overcome in creating these institutions of monetary solidarity and 
in what sense they actually constitute monetary solidarity.  
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Fig.5: Reforms and feedback loop 
 
The European Stability Mechanism replaced a first temporary fund in late 2012. It 
includes the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, by which the Commission 
can borrow, for the first time, up to €60 billion against the security of the EU budget. 
This gives the ESM a capacity to raise up to €500 billion in capital markets through 
bond issues that are then guaranteed by the member states, according to a key that 
is determined by their paid-up capital in the ECB. In this and other respects, the ESM 
has been very much designed taking the IMF as a role model. The term ‘creditor 
countries’ is therefore rather misleading: the proper name should be ‘guarantor 
countries’. Countries that are themselves in a troika programme are exempted from 
acting as guarantors for another country. Non-euro members of the EU can also be 
supported as long as they have signed the Fiscal Compact.  
How were the political difficulties of a diverse union to agree to fiscal risk sharing 
overcome in this case? The lending capacity of the ESM is almost five times the 
maximum the IMF has lent in any one year (2012). There was massive political 
resistance to the ESM’s creation. The first attempt to create an emergency fund, in 
May 2010, was forced upon governments by the ECB. Then ECB President Trichet 
made such a fund a precondition for the first bond-buying programme. This first facility 
was an obscure legal construct and was meant to last for three years only. The 
austerity-minded, liberal Slovakian government at the time refused to take part in the 
first Greek bailout programme. It had just introduced budgetary cuts in parliament and 
it argued that the case for cuts would be undermined if Slovakia had at the same time 
to commit funds for a country with a higher per capita income and a track record of 
violating rules of membership. We can assume that most governments could see the 
point but there was also a real anxiety about spreading market panic and small 
countries freeriding, knowing that their (non-)participation would not make or break a 
deal. A large cushion of callable capital (€80 billion) dealt with that problem in the ESM 
design: Slovakia had to pay in its share and to that extent guarantee and bear losses 
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in the future, if the capital is ever called. In this sense, the ESM is a mandatory mutual 
insurance fund.  
The official language gives us a clue to why the political obstacles were overcome, 
apparent in the Slovakian response but also a series of constitutional court cases in 
Germany, The Commission often refers to the ESM now as a ‘fire wall’, suggesting 
that it is built for those not – yet – affected, the guarantor countries, among them those 
threatened by contagion, rather than as an insurance fund for those shunned by 
markets. The term ‘fire wall’ is of course also a rhetorical concession to those 
obsessed with risk prevention as the opposite of risk sharing. The risk sharing is 
indeed limited because the ESM still does not foresee joint liability, only each 
according to its share in the ECB capital determined by a member’s size in economic 
and demographic terms. There is some solidarity involved in the sense that 
governments guarantee and pay according to ability, not for instance according to 
some risk criteria or experience rating (whereby previous programme countries would 
have to guarantee and pay more). 
The conditions under which a country can obtain the guarantees also provides 
evidence of resistance to the creation of this fiscal capacity. The conditions attached 
to assistance are extremely intrusive and require adjustment that goes way beyond 
what a typical IMF programme demands. The fiscal turnaround that Greece had to 
achieve was staggering and it is not surprising that it turned the economy into 
downward tailspin. Yet two of the ESM programme countries, Ireland and Spain, 
imposed most of the conditions on themselves, anticipating what market investors 
supposedly want to see. Moreover, the sums involved in the troika programmes are 
correspondingly staggering, far beyond the average for IMF programmes, as a Bruegel 
study has calculated. 30  Between 1993 and 2012, an average IMF programme 
amounted to about 3.5% of a programme country’s GDP. In the EU, only Romania’s 
IMF-EU programme and the bank restructuring programme of Spain financed by the 
ESM had about this size. Even for Latin American countries, the average of IMF 
programmes was 5.5% of GDP. Figure 6 shows the loan sizes for the European 
programmes.31 
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Fig.6: Programme size (as % of national GDP) 
 
 
Source: Eurostat and IMF country reports, own calculations (only disbursed sums included) 
It is bitter for citizens, in these countries and in the rest of the euro area sympathising 
with their unfortunate fellow Europeans, that most of these staggering funds go 
towards servicing debt. Only a fraction pays for unemployment, health care and 
education in these countries. The burden of adjustment is distributed one-sidedly on 
the programme countries, both in contrast to guarantor countries and to banks in the 
euro area. It is more like a means-tested programme of residual welfare with harsh 
and stigmatising conditions on the poor than modern social insurance that leaves the 
beneficiaries their dignity. This high share of debt servicing costs is the perverse 
outcome of previous successful risk pooling through the euro: the absence of 
exchange rate risks allowed households, banks and governments to take high financial 
risks, and the need for adjustment is correspondingly large. And it is so one-sidedly 
distributed because the other member states would have to bear some of the costs, 
notably in the guise of higher interest rates in the euro area. I come back to this in the 
next section. 
The banking union contains an element that has tried to address this: bail-in rules. 
Bail-in is meant to ensure that bank shareholders are part of the insurance pool and 
bear a good share of the losses. The legislation, applicable to the whole Single Market 
and in force since January 2016, foresees “a contribution to loss absorption and 
recapitalisation equal to an amount not less than 8% of the total liabilities including 
own funds of the institution under resolution” (Art. 44(5) BRRD). Article 44 defines a 
clear hierarchy of liabilities, which can be written down or converted into shares (the 
conversion rate of debt into shares does not have to be 1:1 and can involve a write-
down). The bail-in basis includes every liability, from junior to senior debt, unless it is 
specifically excluded; the most important exclusion is savings deposits below the 
€100,000 threshold. 
19
20
4
3.8
115
43
44
57
Hungary
Latvia
Romania
Spain
Greece (3 programmes)
Ireland
Portugal
Cyprus
23 
 
However, the wisdom of applying these rules automatically and uniformly can be 
questioned. On the one hand, they admit that banks will be bailed out and so moral 
hazard is a legitimate concern; shareholders who may suffer losses should be more 
effective monitors than savers. On the other hand, they may hit shareholders that 
sensible legislation would like to spare. Pension funds and insurers are important 
investors in long-term assets: bonds of and shares in banks are such assets. This is 
one of the mechanisms by which a banking crisis can spread to non-bank financial 
institutions. Their losses may affect the pensions they can pay out or promise to future 
customers. Even worse, banks’ bonds and shares may also be held by pensioners 
directly: the latter was the case in the notorious example of four regional banks which 
failed in Italy in 2015. What made the headlines was the suicide of an Italian pensioner 
(BBC 2015). Like many Italians, he held his lifetime savings in the form of shares, ie 
subordinated debt of his bank. These shares were wiped out in the insolvency of 
Banca Etruria; his suicide note indicated that the loss of his pension savings was the 
reason for his fateful decision. While EU rules had not yet been in force at the time 
and Italian banks could be accused of having sold these instruments in bad faith, this 
sad case indicated the difficulties of creating rules for fair and efficient risk sharing in 
a diverse union. 
The banking union created the world’s largest bank supervisor, measured in terms of 
bank assets of jurisdictions with free capital movement. This can be seen as preparing 
the ground for a euro area-wide risk pool of banking. Those who opposed it, like the 
German Treasury, understood this but suspected that other parties would take 
advantage of the insurance and offload ‘legacy’ problems, ie pre-existing private debt. 
But even they could see, at the height of the crisis in mid-2012, that an implosion of 
the financial system would also hurt their economies. And so the banking union was 
created with the ECB as the single supervisor. Mario Draghi in return gave his ‘do 
whatever it takes’-speech. The unique ability of a central bank to create liquidity and 
pay attention to the macro-dimension of a bank crisis made governments in other 
jurisdictions, like the US and the UK, also give their monetary authorities 
responsibilities of financial supervision. But the shift in the euro area was quite 
‘radical’.32 
Timid resolution facilities have been created: a Single Resolution Mechanism, 
eventually paid for by the industry, will amount to €60 billion when it is fully up and 
running. This may not be enough to bail out even a single big bank such as the Royal 
Bank of Scotland. Hence, fiscal backing will be needed in the case of a bigger calamity 
and this gives national authorities a considerable voice in the decision-making 
process. There is great uncertainty on how this will work in practice when quick 
decisions have to be made. A Direct Resolution Mechanism had been created earlier 
inside the ESM, to the tune of €55 billion. Spanish authorities argued that it is counter-
productive to have a government restructure its banking system with a loan that adds 
to its debt and may therefore make it a target of a bond market attack. The principle 
that there should be a loan facility that does not contribute to the feedback loop was 
acknowledged. But then, the mechanism was designed ‘so as not to be used’ as I 
have heard a senior ECB official say.    
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The creation of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme got under way because it was 
agreed as part of the banking union package, but Germany with finance minister 
Schäuble reneged. Euro area-wide deposit insurance could slow down the deposit 
flight that is facilitated by TARGET. But it has to be said that in the recent crisis, it 
would have made little difference: banks did not lend, not because they had no way of 
refinancing credit, but because they were sceptical about the prospect of repayment. 
Runs on banks in retail markets were the exception, not the rule.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
4.2 WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE 
A group of 14 French and German economists has drawn up a coherent package of 
reforms that can be seen as essential.33 The hope was that there will be a window of 
opportunity for two newly elected governments led by Emmanuel Macron and Angela 
Merkel to do a grand reform project. From my perspective, this was always a faint 
prospect even if the German Grand Coalition had got a stronger political mandate and 
the new French President had not been preoccupied with a domestic reform agenda. 
The political climate for such overt integrationist steps is not there, as polities are, for 
valid reasons, deeply divided over the merit of such moves and the political authority 
of heads of government is too exhausted to carry the day.  
The biggest questions of them all is whether a monetary union can survive without a 
fiscal union. There are eminent economists like Paul De Grauwe and Paul Krugman 
but also political scientists like Simon Hix who argue that this is not possible. A fiscal 
union means to them a budget that can stabilise the macroeconomy, bail out member 
states if necessary and possibly do all the redistribution that is needed between poor 
and rich regions to make them feel part of one polity. Others, like Martin Sandbu and 
the 14 economists disagree and look for minimalist solutions that make the euro area 
much less crisis prone, short of a fiscal union. The political economy of monetary 
solidarity is closer to the latter group and complements their research on policy 
inventions by looking for the latent unity-preserving functions of existing institutions. 
A federal budget is not necessarily the best way to achieve risk sharing in a monetary 
union of democratically governed member states that are very diverse. A central 
budget for such a union needs democratic representation, given that member states’ 
spending depends more or less extensively on this budget and revenue sources are 
shared or assigned to particular levels of government. One would need a euro area 
parliament with the right to sign off the budget, representing the euro area taxpayer. 
The present European Parliament could not legitimately do this, as citizens of bigger 
member states are underrepresented relative to small ones. The MEPs from the 
smallest member state represent less than 70,000 citizens each while the MEPs from 
the largest represent more than 700,000 citizens.34 This is to compensate for the fact 
that French, German, Italian and Spanish MEPs have a great mass of 
parliamentarians that represent national interests on every committee and in every 
party family. The political-economic paradox of diversity is a hard constraint for the 
feasibility of a fiscal union and the corresponding democratic legitimation.     
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So priorities have to be determined and creative compromises sought. One priority is 
dealing with the precarious fiscal situation in many countries. For instance, it would 
take Italy a primary budget surplus (without interest payments) of over 4% of GDP to 
get its debt stock down to the 60% ratio of the EU fiscal rules within 25 years, even if 
one could somehow guarantee an average interest rate of 3.5%. This calculation was 
done by the German Sachverständigenrat in 2013, and the debt situation has 
deteriorated since then.35 It is inconceivable that the Italian democracy can sustain 
such a hardline fiscal policy over a quarter of a century. If debt cannot be reduced in 
an orderly way, however, then the Italian government will have to lean more and more 
on domestic banks to buy their bonds because foreign bond holders will not do so, or 
only at rates that would bring the day of reckoning (insolvency) nearer. And as long as 
the debt situation is so precarious, other sovereigns and the taxpayers they represent 
do not want to incur common liability with any Italian government, even with 
trustworthy political leaders; the Italian debt situation is beyond anybody’s control. 
Constructive proposals therefore concern a) ways to write down sovereign debt; b) 
some form of joint fiscal liability if a bank rescue is required big enough to touch the 
interest of other member states; and c) a way to prevent renationalisation of 
government debt holdings by banks. This would go a long way to making the euro 
area more robust against the threat of a systemic crisis. The threat has at its core an 
oversized financial system combined with dangerously limited risk sharing between 
interdependent economies.   
A bankruptcy law for sovereign debtors has been a long-standing demand, first 
expressed by progressive critics of the IMF in the 1980s and then by the IMF itself but 
opposed by a Republican majority in Congress in the early 2000s. It has been recently 
revived by a group of authors convened by the Bruegel think tank.36 The basic idea is 
not to allow private creditors to hold out and prevent a debt restructuring that any large 
firm in a similar situation would get, shrinking the economy in the process. The threat 
of insolvency would impose much needed discipline on financial markets. Highly 
indebted governments would pay a higher risk premium, especially at the introduction, 
which is why the greatest potential beneficiaries tend not to be very supportive of it.37 
But a bankruptcy law for sovereigns is an international public good long overdue. It 
would give policymakers one more instrument to break the diabolic loop when market 
investors turn the table on governments that have just bailed them out. And since the 
evident risk sharing is between a debtor country and private bond investors, political 
resistance may be overcome, even though the risk premia on interest rates mean that 
all euro area members will have to exercise some solidarity with each other. 
Insolvency provisions would have to be introduced for the euro area or, even 
preferably the EU, as this would comprise such a large debt market that investors 
could not simply shun European government bonds.                                                             
Joint fiscal liability is another construction site for the union, given that bank bailouts 
can easily overstretch national fiscal capacities. A group of financial economists has 
come up with a privately provided, synthetic euro bond, European Safety Bonds or 
ESBies.38 Financial institutions would take a well-diversified portfolio of euro area 
government bonds as backing for the issue of a senior tranche (‘ESBies’) and a junior 
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tranche (‘EJBies’). The latter would take losses in the case of a debt write-down. Banks 
would be allowed to hold only the senior tranche which will be readily accepted by the 
ECB as security in refinancing operations. This would amount to a guarantee of a floor 
for the price of these ESBies and so make them indeed safe. Even so, it is somewhat 
counter-intuitive that one can break the diabolic loop through the same financial 
engineering techniques, securitisation and tranching, which got the OECD world into 
a financial crisis in 2007-8. A number of questions are still discussed, in particular 
whether ESBies are really possible as a purely private investor initiative. Who would 
want to hold the junior tranche, and at what price, given that banks are no longer meant 
to hold them? This question drives home the point that without some sovereign debt 
restructuring, the volumes involved may easily overstretch the willingness of investors 
other than banks to hold so much government debt. ESBies are still a path-breaking 
idea in presenting an alternative to a federal budget. This would certainly lower the 
threshold for political agreement. 
Finally, if one needs to make sure that the outstanding government bonds are held at 
reasonable prices, it is all the more important to require banks to diversify their 
sovereign bond holdings. This is the dilemma that the first demands for reform to the 
Basel rules did not address. So far, the Basel rules give government bonds of a certain 
credit rating zero risk weighting, ie banks do not have to hold capital against them. If 
positive risk weighting was introduced, banks will shed government bonds in droves, 
weakening other large bondholders, pension funds and insurers through falling bond 
prices. An intriguing idea to promote diversified holdings has been put forward by 
Nicolas Véron: ‘sovereign concentration charges’ would require banks to hold capital 
against bond holdings from any one government if they exceed a certain share (eg 
one third) of their tier-1 (loss-absorbing) capital.39 The charge would apply irrespective 
of whether the bonds have been issued by their own or, say, the German government, 
This risk weighting method would not discourage bond holdings by banks as such, but 
it would give incentives to hold them in relatively safe proportions. Such a regulatory 
measure would decisively contribute to private pooling of fiscal risks. 
 
5 INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS: UNITY IN DIVERSITY AS THE NORM 
The euro is a supranational money without a state. And this is key for those who 
believe that the euro area crisis was not a problem of a few mis-behaving countries. 
Their labelling as PIIGS, periphery, Southern Europe (which includes Ireland) 
insinuates uniformity where no such uniformity is to be found: Greece shared with 
Spain high growth and a high current account deficit but not a housing boom and a 
positive fiscal balance; Portugal was the one country that did not enjoy a post-
accession boom and was tipped over the edge by the deep recession; Cyprus was, 
like Ireland, a high-income country with an overheating economy, fuelled by 
problematic practices of tax competition. As different as their vulnerabilities were, their 
crises all showed a similar pattern: a diabolic loop which they entered from different 
starting points. This means that the national crises had a systemic component and 
were not all the fault of past and present governments. If one had required banks to 
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take the losses from their reckless lending, Austrian, French and German bond 
markets could have panicked as well. 
Some observers who share this diagnosis think the euro area is doomed if it does not 
turn itself into a fiscal federation. A budget at the euro area level requires democratic 
representation, and it is not clear how a development can be set in motion towards 
such a democratic united states of Europe. Why should voters endorse steps towards 
ever closer union when the benefits are so uncertain? In the history of nation states, 
such questions were usually settled by force: state-building benefitted those who won 
the war. But the EU is an authority without an army, created to promote peace and 
cooperation through economic integration. It must convince, not coerce.  
It is impossible to claim that a federal budget would do away with financial instability. 
It is quite likely that it would help to eliminate the symptom of negative feedback loops. 
But the US still has severe financial crises, in banking and in stock markets, that affect 
some US states and municipalities more severely than others. Complete risk sharing 
is a nirvana. Moreover, additional risk sharing increases risk taking, which is 
sometimes desirable. But it is not desirable with oversized financial systems, which 
have to change a lot if they are to make a constructive, as opposed to extractive, 
economic contribution. 
Reforms that avoid the need for grand state-building are therefore not only the more 
realistic alternative, they are actually the more desirable alternative. Incremental 
reform, under the threat of latent and actual crisis, will remain the order of the day and 
this is the fault of no country or person. It is the modus operandi of legitimate decision 
making in a diverse union of democracies: political majorities and their representatives 
in different member states disagree on such consequential, hard to revise decisions. 
‘Unity in diversity’is a more worthwhile goal for the time being than ‘ever closer union’. 
Some of these reforms will have to be innovative, for instance ESBies, because they 
try to emulate state functions, notably pooling of fiscal liabilities. Others are creative, 
such as the sovereign concentration surcharge, in that they use known regulatory 
techniques, such as risk-weighting of assets, and make them compatible with the 
imperative that a lot of sovereign bonds still have to be voluntarily held by financial 
institutions. These reforms are in the footsteps of already implemented reforms, like 
the European Stability Mechanism and bail-in rules for bank resolution: both 
mechanisms to address sovereign emergencies. All of these reforms must have as 
their goal that they reallocate risks to those who benefit from taking them in good times 
and should therefore also absorb the losses in bad times.  
Fortunately, we can also rely on existing institutions and their latent capacities to bear, 
diversify and absorb risks. This is fortunate, because all innovative and creative 
reforms have two problems. First, they are untested and may therefore not work as 
intended (eg bail-in rules); and, second, they may be resisted and perverted because 
they require trust in the other contracting parties not to exploit the collective good (eg 
deposit guarantee scheme). Tried and tested institutions tend to surprise less and 
have already overcome the resistance against their creation. 
28 
 
In my research on the political economy of monetary solidarity, I have found that 
institutions under stress can provide the collective good of risk sharing even though 
this was not the purpose when they were created. But it requires research to find this 
in a common currency, in a cross-border payments system, in esoteric features of 
monetary policy like the collateral that the central bank accepts in its refinancing 
operations, and even in the specifics of trade policy and migration rights in an 
economic and monetary union.  
There is more risk sharing and solidarity in monetary integration than meets the eye. 
This must also be brought to the attention of an understandably disappointed and 
disillusioned European public. Political support for the common currency erodes slowly 
but surely if only the downside risks come to the public’s attention but not the tangible 
benefits for consumers and investors, tourists and pensioners. Member state 
governments are always told off for their broken commitments but never publicly 
acknowledged for the mutual insurance they provide to each other. Greek and Italian 
governments have relied on the ECB and other safeguards in the euro area crisis but 
they also contributed more than their fair share in the international refugee crisis and 
rightly expect that this is part of the overall assessment. Ultimately, politics and 
economics must come together to make a currency union of diverse member states. 
This will always be a contentious process but it does not have to be divisive. 
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